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Overview 
The collapse of the USSR revamped the political landscape of post-Soviet countries. 
The instant spread of new ideologies and development of multi-party systems caused 
the number of political leaders to skyrocket and the explosion of alternative media 
outlets challenged local electorates, with no prior experience, to choose between 
ideologies, parties and candidates. The superficial nature of voting in Soviet Union 
with a ‘one candidate, one ideology’ principle did not require complex decision 
making and had kept citizens detached from politics. Far from being a race, elections 
provided no agenda for the Soviet media or public scrutiny. As early as 1990– 1 
during the first democratic parliament and presidential elections, Ukrainian citizens 
had to choose between multiple candidates representing different ideologies and party 
affiliations. The choice voters had to make was not at all easy as a brand new 
political, social and media context  required  a  completely  different  cognitive  
approach.  What  one could  call  ‘communist’  cognitive  structures  were  ill-suited  
to  the  new realities  and  were  to  undergo  substantial  changes.  The  specific  
sociopolitical  context  in  the  USSR  impacted  on  the  political  cognition of  Soviet  
voters  and  began  the development  of  specific  political  schemas.  In this chapter it 
is argued that this process led to an overlap in old and new schemas over a period of 
time and here the cognitive structures of post-Soviet  voters are  assessed  with an  
emphasis on  the  coexistence  of schemas of both ‘communist’ and ‘democratic’ 
leaders.  
 
Introduction 
 
Since the inception of systematic voting research in the 1940s, scientists have  
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attempted  to  describe  voting  behavior  in  terms  of  social  factors.  Lazarsfeld 
canvassed the field with the so-called sociological or Columbia model (1944) 
stressing the importance of social factors in voters’ decision making. Campbell, 
Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) went beyond and put psychological factors, like 
early-learned social identifications with the party, at the core of their ‘funnel of 
causality’ model, also known as the social-psychological  or  Michigan  model  of  
voting.  The  rational  choice approach, sometimes referred to as the Chicago model, 
was brought to political science by Downs (1957), describing voting as value-
maximising ‘rational calculus’, where voters weigh the pros and cons of each 
candidate based on their self-interest.  
Although  each  of  these  approaches  established  its  own  paradigm  in  
voting  behaviour  research,  long  before  the  cognitive  revolution  in  psychology 
in the late 1970s/early 1980s, they did not include one of the key variables in decision 
making, i.e., the processing of political information. As Herstein (1981, p. 844) 
concludes, these traditional political science models  of  voting  are  cognitively  
impractical  as  they  fail  to account  for ‘mental processes that accompany a vote’. 
With the cognitive revolution, the direction of voting behaviour research changed as 
well. From the early 1980s the primary focus shifted to the schematic perception of 
political leaders (see Kinder, Peters, Abelson and Fiske, 1980; Fiske and Linville, 
1980; Lodge and Wahlke, 1982; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Lau and Sears,   1986; 
Miller, Wattenburg and  Malanchuk,  1986;  Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland, 1991; 
Lau and Redlawsk, 2006).  
The advantage of schema theory for political psychology was  that it picked up 
research right where  past models of voting behaviour had failed. Particularly, it 
seemed to have answered a lasting question posed by Converse in 1964 – how do 
people make quite logical decisions if they only have limited knowledge of, and 
interest in, political events? According to Rosch (1975) exposure to an overload of 
information leads people to rely on cognitive structures which serve as mental 
shorthand, minimising cognitive burden by organising, storing and processing 
information more effectively. These structures called cognitive schemas develop over  
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time  through people’s repeated experience with  others, objects, situations events and 
organise the way they perceive the environment (Shaw, 1990). Schema theory 
established an original view of people as ‘cognitive misers’ sparing the efforts they 
need to process, interpret and understand complex social information (Augoustinos 
and Walker, 1996).  
Borrowing an elaborate definition from Lau and Sears (1986, p. 349), ‘a schema is a 
hierarchical organization of knowledge in a particular domain’. For example politics 
contains a category label (politicians), its general description (typically elected 
middle-aged or older males), higher- and lower-order categories (broad categories at 
the top vs. particular instances at the bottom), and inter-correlations between them 
(Barrack Obama is liberal – liberals are for social welfare policies and universal 
healthcare).  
One way to illustrate how a schema simplifies perception is to use the analogy of a 
postal code. A worker at the sorting station does not need to read all the information 
to sort the letters properly, as s/he only has to read  a code containing the necessary 
information in a fairly straightforward way (Shaw, 1990). However there is a 
shortcoming – a postal code only refers to a respective geographic unit, but it does 
not contain the name and exact address of the receiver. In a similar fashion, cognitive 
schemas only give a ‘ballpark estimate’ of a person or object although this is usually 
enough to successfully make decisions without digesting excessive amounts of 
information. After all, as ‘cognitive misers’, or ‘motivated tacticians’, we do not need 
a precise reconstruction of social objects at the cost of extensive and impractical 
cognitive efforts. Instead, the purpose of schemas is to mini- mise our cognitive 
efforts by providing hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which include plans for 
interpreting and gathering further information (Taylor and Crocker, 1981). In the 
context of political psychology, simple examples of leader-related schemas can 
include such broad dimensions as charisma, competence and physical attractiveness, 
or more narrow ones like communist or democrat.  
Cognitive schemas also contain sets of prototypes that summarise the most typical 
characteristics of an object. Thus we may consider the prototype an average default 
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setting of the schema. Considering the schema  of  a  general  politician,  a  
prototypical  political  leader  will  perhaps  be  a respectable  mid-aged  male,  
wearing  a  suit  and  driven  in  a  limousine. Depending on people’s experience, a 
prototype may then include other  more abstract properties like attractive and 
charismatic, or dishonest and  corrupt. As schemas and prototypes develop based on 
past experience, a prototypical  political  leader  for  US  voters  could  be  a  member  
of  the Democratic  or  Republican  Party,  while  for  Chinese  and  Cuban  voters 
s/he will perhaps be a communist.  
In reality, people do not deal just with the average properties of social objects. Hence 
schema develop from the experience of  dealing with particular exemplars (Stillings 
et al, 1995). While  a prototype is the average representation of a schema, an 
exemplar is its specific example. The schema of a ‘charismatic politician’ may 
contain such vivid exemplars as Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill or Charles de 
Gaulle, while a ‘communist leader’ schema may have exemplars of Vladimir Lenin, 
Mao Zedong or Fidel Castro. For a ‘democrat’ schema, American voters may hold an 
exemplar of John Kennedy or Barack Obama, whereas for the post-Soviet  electorate, 
most Western leaders and not  necessarily  those   belonging to a left or centre party 
would fulfil this role. Likewise, Western Europeans  and  Americans  might  consider  
Mikhail Gorbachev  an  outstanding democratic leader (Harris Interactive/Financial 
Times, 2006) while post-Soviet citizens would regard him as failed pro-reform 
communist (Public Opinion Fund, 2006).  
Before a schema can be applied to any person, inclusive of political leaders, they first 
need to be categorised. Categorisation is a fundamental characteristic of human 
perception and occurs whenever people identify or label a given individual, whether a 
political leader or a taxi driver (Augoustinos et al., 2006). The categorisation process 
is closely linked  to  the prototypes and schemas people store in memory.1 In fact a 
prototype contains features or categories used to define an object (Anderson, 1995). 
Therefore, objects are categorised  around  prototypes,  or  with  prototypical  features  
in  mind,  in order to confirm whether a new instance fits the ‘schema average’. Let 
us suppose that the prototype of the ‘charismatic politician’ schema will be an 
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attractive leader with outstanding speaking abilities and a talent to  inspire   and    
lead  people. Supposedly, the most salient features or attributes voters  will  use   to  
categorise  leaders as charismatic will be attractiveness, communication skills and the 
abilities to persuade and\ lead. Then, if a certain leader matches a prototype stored in 
memory, s/he will be categorised as a charismatic politician. If a leader exhibits traits 
and behaviours that do not fit any existing schema, this will possibly lead  schema 
assimilation or adaptation.  
As one can see, schema theory provides a convenient framework to study voting 
behaviour. However, this approach in political psychology receives less attention due 
to the need for a level of research complexity. Unfortunately, public opinion polls 
with closed-ended questions, which serve as bread and butter for behavioural 
researchers, do not allow for the modelling of cognitive processes. Schema studies 
usually require multi-stage handcrafted designs, typically with open-ended questions, 
quasi-experiments and a mixed-method approach incorporating qualitative techniques 
such as focus groups and cognitive interviews, alongside survey research. To a 
certain extent Miller et al.’s observation made back in the 1980s regarding the state of  
schema research still seems relevant: ‘candidate evaluations are one of the most 
important but least understood facets of American voting behavior’ (Miller et al., 
1986, p. 521).  
Miller’s statement highlights one more important idea: most schema research has a 
distinct American flavour and thus findings cannot be generalised to other societies 
with different political systems and cultures. At the same time, the state of 
corresponding studies in Europe is limited, but 1 When describing categorisation 
processes here we refer to theories of ‘categorisation by prototype’ or ‘categorisation 
by schema’ (Lane and Nadel, 2002). not due to lack of interest, studies or data. 
Schema research in the United States is simply more feasible because of the bi-party 
model as well as the stability and succession of a political system deeply rooted in 
social life.  
Yet, as we move into the post-communist world, studying the voters’ cognitive  
system becomes even more complicated. With passive and atomised political culture 
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(Chudovsky and Kuzio, 2003), citizens’ political apathy, the predominance of 
survivalist and materialist cultural values Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), a mix of 
ideologies, social cross-pressures and  the  perpetual  change  of  political  and  
electoral systems over  two decades, the cognitive system of post-Soviet voters must 
substantially differ from that inferred by research in traditional democracies. As an 
illustration, throughout the 1990s voters in post-communist Ukraine were typically 
choosing from over thirty parties and dozens of candidates. Taking into account a 
classic thesis that voters are not fools (Key, 1966) then a primary question of interest 
for political psychologists is what their choices are based upon. This chapter will 
attempt to answer this by examining the cognitive system of post-Soviet voters in the 
mid-to-late 1990s. Cognitive schemas and conceptualisation of politicians in a post-
Soviet context  
Due to insufficient previous research on the political cognition of post-Soviet 
voters, an inductive approach appeared more feasible for the con-struction of relevant 
theory. Firstly, several research questions concerning voters’ conceptualisation of 
politics arising from socio-political changes in the  former USSR in the early 1990s  
are highlighted. Next, plausible answers are sought by blending together research 
findings from American, European and post-Soviet studies.  
Acknowledging the role of the unique social-political environment in which post-
Soviet voters found themselves in the 1990s, the first question is how this new 
context impacted on their conceptualisation of politics and politicians. A second 
question naturally arises from the fact that the political experience of post-Soviet 
voters was characterised by two distinct periods either side of the fall of the USSR. 
Referring to schema change theories, the key problem here is how pre-existing 
schemas of leaders were affected  during  voters’ resocialisation in the late 1980s– 
1990s. Thirdly taking into consideration a chaotic mix of communist and post-
communist ideologies after the collapse of the USSR, it is very likely that schemas of 
existing leaders adjusted  to fit the new types of emerging politicians. Additionally it 
is not known on which basis – ideological, party identification, professional or 
personal characteristics – these types were developing. 
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The changing political context and conceptualisation of political leaders. 
From the standpoint of many paradigms in social cognition, whether taking 
Heider’s attribution-based ‘consistency seeker’ as one of the oldest (Heider, 1958), or 
Fiske and Taylor’s information-processing ‘motivated tactician’ as one of the most 
recent (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), the problem of voters’ choice is viewed similarly, as 
prior to decision making, images of candidates must be identified and interpreted by 
the voters. The peculiarities of this decision-making process are subject to varying 
views within different paradigms, but research from the last few decades converges 
on the idea that it involves two key phases: ‘categorisation’, i.e. reconstruction of a 
candidate’s image using salient or primed classification criteria, and ‘comparison’ of 
retrieved images with pre-existing information already stored in the memory. In 
modern cognitive social and political psychology this pre-existing information is 
generally known as schemas (Piaget, 1926; Axelrod, 1973; Anderson, 1981).2  
Following Fiske and Taylor’s cognitive miser paradigm, the number of voters’ 
schemas should be quite limited: a finding which has been repeatedly confirmed in 
empirical studies (Kinder  et  al., 1980; Miller et al 1986). The reason is that the level 
of schema development and abstraction depends on the political sophistication of the 
voters  (Lau  and  Sears, 1986). However, as much as voters are cognitive misers they 
are  also ‘not fools’ as Key previously suggested. This should mean that the number 
of voters’ schemas must be sufficient to effectively process political information and 
eventually make a choice. Along with Caprara, Barbaranelli and Zimbardo (2002) we 
believe that schematic perception can be interpreted in terms of parsimony. 
Parsimony in this context implies that ‘voters reduce complex political environments 
and develop uniquely simplified perceptions of political candidates during 
campaigns’ (Caprara et al., p. 72). If we describe schematic perception as the 
reduction of ‘N’ actual political characters to ‘n’ broad universal types already 
existing in voters’ memories, then it begins to resemble a sampling procedure which, 
based on a limited number of representative observations called schemas, voters can 
generalise their predictions to the entire target population of political leaders.  
The idea of parsimony in schematic perception has found numerous empirical 
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verifications. In the study by Kinder et al. (1980), leader schemas tended to be 
clustered around two broader dimensions: candidate’s  
2 For an alternative view of  the schema as the reworking of an attitude model, see 
the excellent critique by Kuklinski, Luskin and Bolland (1991). 
Where red dictators coexist with promising democrats character and 
performance. Miller et al. (1986) identified five factorschemas that activate during 
candidates’ evaluation: competence, integrity, reliability, charisma and personal 
attributes, which may be similarly grouped in character and performance clusters. 
Alongside  these, Lau (1986) pinpointed issues, group relations, candidate personality 
and party identification schemas. As described, the range of identified leader schemas 
can be reduced to a limited number of dimensions.  
Extrapolating the idea of schematic parsimony to post-Soviet realities, we 
argue that several factors make the perception of political leaders in newly emerged 
democracies such as Ukraine quite distinct. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, 
because of the diverse political landscape in times of transition post-Soviet voters 
probably developed  a number of leader  prototypes  to  account  for  newly  
emerging types of politicians. Secondly, since the cognitive system of post-Soviet 
voters represents a mix of abstract democratic and authoritarian concepts (Diligenski, 
1994) it is also expected that leader schemas encompass both communist and post-
communist elements. Modern cognitive psychology describes several modes of 
schema transformation. Schemas can alter gradually with the receipt of new 
discordant information, change completely when incongruent information exceeds a 
certain threshold or develop hierarchies  by  accommodating  new  subtypes.  To find  
an  appropriate fitting post-Soviet realities, further consideration of schema 
transformation is required. 
Theories of political schema change and their applicability to the post-Soviet 
context 
It is generally assumed that once developed and validated, schemas function as fairly 
stable and static cognitive structures (Fiske and Taylor, 2008 p.  81).  How  does  this  
correlate  with  the  political  (re)socialisation  of  a typical adult voter in the former 
Київський університет імені Бориса Грінченка 
© П.Д. Фролов, О.В. Петрунько, Д.В Позняк, 2013 
USSR, first during communism and then in the course of democratisation following 
the collapse of the USSR?  
Modern research shows that schemas are indeed very stable if there are no 
motivations for their change (Fiske and Taylor, 2008) – that is if voters face a fairly 
constant and predictable political environment. If, however, such an environment 
undergoes substantial changes, such as the transformation of a social and political 
system, pre-existing schemas will cease to perform their main function and  will  
either  disappear  or  transform (e.g., Conover and Feldman, 1984). A vivid example 
often employed in sci-fi literature is the failure of astronauts’ Earth-based schemas to 
successfully recognise objects on a newly ‘inhabited’ planet. Similarly we may rely 
on old schemas even in unusual circumstances, for example, when searching for a 
dining place in an exotic country. One possible option may be lunch at a well-known 
international chain restaurant where we already know what to expect. However, we 
may need to go beyond what our schemas can envisage, by exploring local cuisine. In 
this case, our schemas will have to adapt to the new environment. It is  an  accepted 
view that schemas can change (Fiske and Taylor, 2008), although the mechanisms 
and magnitude of this change is subject to discussion.  
The ‘Book-keeping’ or ‘Fine-tune’ model assumes that people gradually adjust 
existing schemas with each piece of information they receive. The scale of such 
changes may vary depending on the level of inconsistency between existing schema 
and  new data, but it is assumed that change will occur incrementally with the 
accumulation of knowledge that contradicts existing schema (Rumelhart and 
Norman, 1978). We  believe  that  this  model  does  not  fit  post-Soviet  realities  as  
it  implies a rather slow and stepwise change over a lengthy time period, while the 
nature of socio-political changes would dictate a different pace of change. 
Additionally, taking into account political transformations in the former USSR, it is 
reasonable to expect the development of new subcategories within existing schemas 
rather than their modification.  
The ‘Conversion model’ implies that while minor inconsistencies between 
schema and incoming data are tolerated, changes occur when this inconsistency 
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exceeds a threshold of subjective tolerance, or simply when inconsistency is large 
enough (Rothbart, 1981). While major transformations occurring in the former USSR 
in 1990s may indirectly support this model we believe that dramatic ‘all-or-none’ 
conversion would mean the disappearance of old schemas where instead the 
development of new subcategories to fit new types of politicians would be expected. 
Additionally, it was shown that this model predicts more change in the presence of a 
single contradictory effect rather than consecutive partially- contradictory  instances  
(Weber  and  Crocker,  1983),  which  was  more characteristic of the Perestroika 
period.3  
The  ‘Subtyping model’ focuses on the hierarchical structure of schemas, with 
superordinate categories on top and subordinate ones at the bottom. While 
subordinate schemas accommodate exceptions in respect of any discrepancy between 
schema  and  data,  superordinate  schemas remain intact (Weber and Crocker, 1983). 
Contrasting with the previous model, the Subtyping model does predict more schema 
change  when disconfirming information is spread rather than concentrated in a few 
cases. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that this model provides a  
3 The Perestroika period refers to the post-1986 era of restructuring which 
heralded the introduction of contested elections.  
Where red dictators coexist with promising democrats better overall  picture of 
the process of schema change (Webber and Crocker, 1983). If we assume that the 
Subtyping  model  provides the best explanation of changes in the cognitive system 
of post-Soviet voters then we should expect schemas to respond to political changes 
by relegating disconfirming instances (e.g., new political types) to new subcategories 
(Augoustinos and Walker, 1996). This would indicate the development of a 
hierarchical structure of leader-related schemas with virtually intact superordinate 
schemas on top and more specific subcategories below – most likely referring to 
types of politicians.  
The basis for the development of leader schema subtypes 
If one subscribes to the Subtyping model of schema change then it should be 
accepted that due to changes in political system after the collapse of the USSR, the 
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voters’ cognitive systems must have accommodated a number of new leader schema 
subtypes. Therefore during the transition period of the 1990s these included a mixture 
of fading communist and emerging post-communist types of political leaders. This 
coexistence of subtypes represents a peculiar political-psychological phenomenon yet 
to be studied and described.  
As studies show, the development of political schemas typically positively 
correlates with political sophistication. Thus experts in any field will have more 
elaborate, structured and easily activated schemas than novices (Luskin, 1987; Lau 
and Sears, 1986). However, this does not mean that a broader range of leader ubtypes 
indicates  high  political  sophistication among post-Soviet voters. Instead, we argue 
that most post-Soviet voters are in fact what Lau and Sears (1986) call political  
novices and their development of new subtypes is rather based on stereotypical 
features of politicians than on available rational information. Although this 
hypothesis has yet to be empirically tested, lines of thought are presented here which 
suggest low levels of political sophistication among post-Soviet voters.  
Firstly, as the transition from communism to democracy in 1990s was only in 
its embryonic stage, it is reasonably hard to expect political expertise from voters 
with no prior experience of democracy in any of its manifestations.  Returning  to  a  
previous  metaphor,  it  would  be  equally naive to expect high sophistication from 
astronauts dealing with an alien planet’s environment.  
Secondly, Adorno’s ‘Authoritarian personality’ studies repeatedly 
demonstrated the psychological rigidity, conformity and dogmatism of the 
communist outlook (Eysenck and Coulter 1972). An analysis  of European Value 
Studies  (EVS)  shows  that  post-Soviet  nations  possess among the lowest tolerance 
scores along with some of the highest levels of  protest activity (Bishop and Poznyak, 
2008). Although one may argue that these characteristics refer rather to personality 
than cognition, ideological content has repeatedly been found to positively correlate 
with  political sophistication. For instance, Tetlock’s (1986) Value Pluralism theory 
assumes that unsophisticated or monistic ideologies, including commu- nism, are 
indicators of low political sophistication.  
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Thirdly, Fiske, Lau and Smith’s (1990) scale of political sophistication is based 
on general political knowledge, political activity, media usage (electronic and 
printed) and politically-related schema (e.g.,  ideology, general interest and perceived 
importance of politics). According to these criteria and data obtained from Ukrainian 
studies, the majority of the post-Soviet electorate when faced with fragmented 
political knowledge, unrefined political activity and quite low media usage, would be 
placed in the category of low-sophisticates (Frolov, 1998; 1999; 2002). Finally, 
patterns of answering political questions by post-Soviet samples demonstrate only a 
limited understanding of relevant issues (Bishop and Poznyak, 2008; Frolov, 2002). 
This, as Carnaghan (2007) argues, can also be used as a direct measure of political 
sophistication.   
In order to provide a more tangible benchmark of ‘low political sophistication’ 
it  is  helpful  to  refer  to  another model of schema elaboration developed by Taylor 
and Winkler (1980). This model includes four stages of schema sophistication, i.e., 
novice, stereotypical, relative expertise and true expertise. Our past research suggests 
that the schema development of post-Soviet voters would best fit the stereotypical 
phase characterised by the development of generalised attributes which define a 
candidate (Frolov,  1998,  1999,  2002).  In  this  case  schema  accommodation  and 
the development of new subtypes can occur through a number of often subtle 
contextual variables that emphasise the link between a schema and a new category 
(Rothbart, 1996). The question is what these contextual variables could be.  
Studies demonstrate that sophisticated voters have a more coherent and  
abstract network of schemas while less politically sophisticated individuals are 
typically aschematic (Hamill and Lodge, 1986). Naturally the latter does not mean 
that voters will have no schemas at all, rather it implies that their schemas will be 
simpler and will rely on more accessible cognitive cues, such as party affiliation and 
the personal and professional characteristics of a candidate (Pierce, 1993). Lau and 
Redlawsk (2001) showed that voters compensate for a lack of knowledge of politics 
by using the most accessible  information  shortcuts  known  as  heuristics.  In  terms  
of the American bi-party political system such shortcuts may be obvious party and 
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ideological heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). However, given low political 
sophistication, the chaotic mix of multiple ideologies and the large number of parties 
and leaders, we expect that such schemas would rely not on political criteria per se, 
i.e., ideology, party, issue position, etc., but on more accessible and less abstract 
criteria primarily associated with the personality and performance of political leaders, 
such as attractiveness, charisma, competence and trust. These criteria are not 
necessarily linked to more complex political schemas and as such are less challenging 
for the voters (Pierce, 1993). This assumption also aligns with our schema change  
model, since in terms of social and  political  instability, people would rather rely on 
more robust criteria like personal and professional characteristics  than on context-
dependent  and political-ideological factors which are prone to change.  
    Measuring political schemas  
A common problem in political cognition research is how to introduce 
schematic concepts into empirical analysis. There have been three dominant 
approaches to this in schema research. The first one stands on the grounds of 
experimental cognitive psychology and studies schematic processing in laboratory 
conditions using indicators like reaction time, i.e., true and false recognitions of 
schema-consistent information. One example of this approach is Hamill and Lodge’s 
(1986) experiment on schema effects.  
The second route deals with direct measurement of cognitive structures that 
presumably underlie political schemas (Conover and Feldman, 1984; 1989). 
Followers of this approach typically refer to Q-sort and similar or complementary 
techniques like thinking-aloud to study the organisational properties of schemas (Lau, 
1986). Q-methodology is particularly advantageous for schema research by virtue of 
correlating respondents rather han variables and reducing individual viewpoints to a 
few dimensions which represent shared perceptions that in turn indicate underlying 
political schemas.  
The third approach utilises data available from mass surveys. It functions by 
highlighting indicators of political schemas available from public opinion polls, such 
as the National  Election Study (NES)  or  General Social Survey (GSS) in the US. 
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The problem associated with this approach is that direct  measurements of schemas 
are  often  too  timeconsuming  to  be  used  in  large-scale  surveys  (Lau  and  Sears,  
1986), hence researchers have to abandon  closed-ended  questions and deal with a 
handful of open-ended questions (Lau, 1986; Miller et al., 1986).  
The advantage, however, is the ability to generalise findings to the entire target 
population. 
In the studies described in this chapter, secondary data could not be used due to 
the absence of a comparable NES or GSS in the Ukraine, therefore the mass survey 
approach was not a viable option. This necessitated an approach to measuring 
cognitive schemas which followed either the first or second routes described  above. 
Instead of a laboratory experiment that would certainly have narrowed the external 
validity of research into social cognition, we  chose  the Q-sort and thinking-aloud 
methods to study the cognitive system employed  by Ukrainian voters.  
    Studying the cognitive systems of Ukrainian voters  
A long-term project  was  carried  in  Ukraine between 1995 and 1998, 
consisting of four consecutive cross-sectional studies (Petrun’ko, 2000). The first 
study (1995) was based on a nationally representative sample  (n = 2005). A set of 
closed and open-ended questions were designed to elicit a political thesaurus from the 
Ukrainian electorate containing both an active and a passive vocabulary considered 
and/or used by voters to describe political leaders. The logic of this study was 
somewhat similar to the NES open-ended like–dislike questions for parties and 
candidates  that  underlie  many  studies  on  political  schemas  in  the  US.  Another 
objective was to obtain a list of political leaders most familiar to Ukrainian  voters  at  
that  time. Data were  processed  by  content  and  frequencies analyses. 
The next three studies shared both research goals and designs. They all  drew 
from   the  political  thesaurus    and   the  list of  political leaders  obtained in the first 
study and each relied on similar research methods such as semantic differentials 
(Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957), Q-methodology or Q-sorting 
technique(Brown, 1980; Conover and Feldman,  1984; McKeown and Thomas, 1988) 
as well as elements of cognitive interviewing such as thinking-aloud (Willis, 2004). 
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These studies  were  conducted  on  relatively  small  non-probability  quota  samples, 
which,  although  arguably  limiting  the  external  validity of  any findings, combined  
quantitative and  qualitative  methods  which would  not  have been possible in a  
mass survey. Q-methodology, however, does not  require large samples, focusing 
instead on the  number of  variables  (Brown, 1980). Obviously, quota  sampling  
shares  drawbacks with all non-representative designs, including an inability to 
estimate how well it represents the population; however, studying psychological 
concepts like cognitive schemas does not necessarily require the precision and data-
fit of  representative samples. Also, the choice of  a  non-probability  design  served 
the additional purpose in three somewhat similar studies  of 
Table 10.1. Research design and methodology used with Ukrainian voters  
 
S
tudy 
S
ample 
size 
Y
ear 
Objecti
ve 
Meth
od 
Data 
analysis   
1 2
005 
1
995 
Voters’ 
political 
thesaurus and 
stimulus 
objects 
Open-
ended 
questions 
Conte
nt and 
frequency 
analyses 
2 1
14 
1
996 
Dimen
sions of 
leader 
categorisation 
Modif
ied semantic 
differential 
Explo
ratory factor 
analysis 
3 5
6 
1
996 
Leader 
schemas and  
prototypes 
Q-sort 
and 
thinking-
aloud 
Cluste
r analyses 
4 4
0 
1
998 
   
Київський університет імені Бориса Грінченка 
© П.Д. Фролов, О.В. Петрунько, Д.В Позняк, 2013 
controlling for the reliability of findings while  manipulating research methods. 
All  three  studies  shared  the  research  objective  of  modelling how Ukrainian 
voters conceptualise political leaders. In the second study (1996; n = 114) we 
employed modified semantic differentials (Osgood  et  al., 1957) and analyseddata 
with exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Our main objective here was to reveal the 
major dimensions of political leader categorisation. In the third (1996; n = 56) and 
fourth studies (1998; n  = 40) we combined Q-sort  with  thinking-aloud  technique  
and  analysed  data  with  EFA  and  hierarchical  cluster analysis (HCA). These two 
studies differed in the list of stimuli objects (political leaders) offered to respondents  
as well as in sampling. In the fourth study, the list was expanded by including notable 
politicians from the past and a sample of voters with a particular interest in politics 
was recruited. An additional goal for these studies, aside from eliciting Ukrainian 
voters’ leader schemas and prototypes, was to compare the conceptualisation of 
political leaders by ‘political novices’ and ‘relative experts’. Table 10.1 provides a 
summary of the overall research design: 
    A political thesaurus of Ukrainian voters  
While many studies on political cognition have used open-ended questions 
about parties’ and candidates’ characteristics from mass surveys, there was no 
comparable NES or GSS in the Ukraine in the mid- 1990s. Thus a bespoke method 
somewhat similar to NES openended questioning was devised with the purpose of 
reconstructing a ‘political thesaurus’  of Ukrainian voters’ language when describing 
political leaders.  
For this purpose, we designed a relatively short and simple questionnaire 
containing two groups of similarly worded open-ended questions.  
The first group of questions was as follows:  
1.  Which modern Ukrainian politicians do you know?  
2.  Who do you consider the best Ukrainian politician? Why?  
3.  What should an ideal political leader be?  
4.  What should an ideal political leader not be?  
5.  Into which groups could you subdivide all the  political leaders you know? 
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Answers to the  first and second questions were used to obtain a list of political 
leaders to act as stimuli for the ensuing studies.4 Answers to the third and fourth 
questions were content analysed and frequency sorted in order to highlight the most 
identified characteristics Ukrainian voters use when describing political leaders. 
Answers to the fifth question facilitated our understanding of how Ukrainian voters 
explicitly classify known political leaders and upon which criteria these 
classifications rely.  
Arguably, the most interesting finding of this study is the political vocabulary 
of  Ukrainian voters. It contains more than 600 words among which the following 
were used most frequently to describe political leaders.  
Characteristics of an ideal political leader (‘An ideal political leader should 
be’):  
1 – Honest; 2 – Smart; 3 – Decent; 4  – Competent; 5 – Even-handed; 6 – 
Determined; 7 – Brave; 8 – Insistent;9 – Assured; 10 – Purposeful; 11 –  
Selfcontrolled; 12 – Independent; 13 –  Optimistic; 14 – Educated; 15 – Intelligent; 
16 – Energetic; 17 – Industrious; 18 – Good speaker; 19 – Reputable; 20 – Rich; 21 – 
Sincere; 22 – Sympathetic; 23 – Promising; 24 – Principled; 25 – Attractive; 26 – 
Kind; 27 – Inspiring; 28 – Strong; 29 – Able to lead; 30 – Has political vision.  
Characteristics of a non-ideal political leader (‘An ideal political leader should 
not be’):  
1– Promise-breaker; 2 – Law-breaker; 3 – Dishonest; 4 – Dodgy; 5 – Bribe-taker; 6 – 
Weak; 7 – Feckless; 8 – Indeterminate; 9 – Unprincipled; 10 – Businessman; 11 – 
Careerist; 12  – Incompetent; 13 – Concerned With Own Wallet; 14 – Pessimist; 15 – 
Populist; 16 – Unpatriotic; 17 – Irresponsible; 18 – Deceiver; 19– Mercenary; 20 – 
Churlish loner; 21– Drinker; 22 – Manipulated; 23 – Unjust; 24 – Unsure; 25 – 
Lightweight; 26 – Lacking own thought; 27 – Poor economist; 28 – Ill-behaved; 29 – 
Purposeless; 30 – Short-tempered.  
4 As the list contains leaders mostly unknown to the audience outside of 
Ukraine their names are omitted, but can be supplied the authors upon request. 
   Where red dictators coexist with promising democrats 
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Frequency analysis showed that respondents most commonly refer to the 
personal characteristics of political leaders with an approximate ratio of   3:1 personal 
to political and ideological characteristics. This is consistent with other studies 
indicating that person-related characteristics dominate voters’ knowledge of 
candidates, a phenomenon which Sears (1969) defined as the ‘personalization of 
politics’. Based on this list we selected twenty-six of the most frequently used 
characteristics which arguably provide the most rounded description of a political 
leader.  
Based on the analysis of respondents’ subjective classifications of political 
leaders  (fifth  question)  we  identified  fifty-six  political  types  high-lighted by 
respondents:  
1– Patriot; 2 – Charismatic leader; 3 – Dissident; 4 – Demagogue; 5 – 
Dilettante; 6 – Marionette; 7 – Symbol of the past; 8 – Dictator; 9 – Fanatic; 10 – 
Psychopath;  11 – Unsympathetic; 12 – Adventurer; 13 – Politically bankrupt; 14 – 
Separatist; 15 –  Fascist; 16 –  Careerist; 17 –  Red leader; 18 –  Professional; 19 –  
People’s favourite; 20 –  Smart Guy; 21 – Time-server; 22 – Reliable; 23 – Populist; 
24 – Reformer; 25 – ‘One of us’; 26 –  Idealist; 27 –  Dark Horse; 28 – Liberal; 29 – 
Right-wing;  30  –    Hard  worker;  31  –    Radical;  32  –  Leftist;  33  –  Member  of  
Parliament;  34  –   State  clerk;  35  –  Practitioner;  36  –  Manager;  37  –    Cabinet 
minister; 38 –  Communist; 39 –  Socialist; 40 –  Party leader; 41 – ‘Power-man’ 
(coming from one of the armed forces: militia; army; intelligence services, etc); 42 – 
Federalist; 43 – Pro-Western; 44 – Democrat; 45 – Centrist; 46 – Presidential 
supporter;  47  –  Power-hungry;  48  –  Neo-imperialist;  49  –  Workhorse; 50  –
Inactive; 51 – Nationalist; 52 –  Theorist; 53 –  Intellectual; 54 –  Oddball; 55 – 
Economist; 56 – Fighter.  
   Dimensions of political leader categorisation  
The objective of the second study (n = 114) was to reveal the most typical way 
respondents think about political leaders. Here we attempted to find what are called 
‘dimensions of political leader categorisation’.  
These dimensions represent chunks of categories revealing particular aspects of 
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political leaders’ personalities, for example, competence, charisma and personal 
attractiveness (Miller et al., 1986).  
Respondents were asked to evaluate thirteen  prominent Ukrainian politicians  
according  to  the  twenty-six  adjectives  which  appeared  most frequently in the first 
study. With the focus on the meaning respondents assign to stimulus objects (political 
leaders), semantic differential scales were used. These featured a seven-point scale 
which permitted a neutral opinion (middle point), provided robust and meaningful 
data and yet was not too tedious to complete.  
The data was processed by exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with maximum 
likelihood extraction and orthogonal Varimax rotationproviding uncorrelated factor 
solution.5 EFA, also known  as R-methodology (Brown, 1980) reduces the variables 
to meaningful factors and provides a summary of classification criteria respondents 
use to categorise political leaders. In line with Miller et al. (1986) these are termed  
criteria  dimensions of political leader categorisation. Although these dimensions are 
related to cognitive schemas, as far as categorisation  
      Table 10.2. Dimensions of political leader categorisation in the Ukraine 
(Study 2)  
 
Dimensions of political leader 
categorisation 
Proport
ion of variance 
explained 
Hypothesised leader prototype6 
1. Political aptitude (competence, 
efficacy and charisma) competent (.879), 
educated (.864), smart (.840), self-assured 
(.815), industrious (.774), good speaker 
(.772), purposive (.737), principled (.718), 
discreet (.712), inspiring (.699); able to lead 
(.683), has political vision (.615) 
47.8%   Competent or expert; efficient; 
charismatic (well-educated, smart, hard-working, 
inspirational, able to lead, having political vision) 
2.  Reliability  brave (.831), 
determined (.817), persistent (.771), active 
(.737), independent (.670) 
7.8% Reliable leader (strong,  determined, and 
hard-working) 
3.  Integrityunderstanding (.751), 
intelligent (.749), sincere (.740), honest 
(.705), just(.699), decent (.661) 
5.9%   Moral leader (empathic with thepeople, 
sincere, honest and just) 
4.  Affluence rich (.865), resourceful 
(.863) 
3.3% Business leader (takingadvantage of 
politics to profiteer) 
5.  Image / Personal characteristics  
optimistic (.696), pleasant (.655), kind (.627), 
attractive (.605) 
3.2% Popular leader (crowd-puller, ‘charged’, 
attracting people) 
Note: The numbers in brackets (factor loadings) are Pearson correlation 
coefficients of a variable with the dimension.  
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5 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy and Bartlett sphericity 
coefficients were well above the thresholds of acceptability. The number of factors 
was selected based on Keiser-Gutman stopping criterion (‘scree-plot’) with 
eigenvalues? 1. Descriptors (variables) correlating with factors at less than .3 were 
excluded from further analysis. 6 Although the authors have no empirical evidence of 
schemas and prototypes underlying these categorisation dimensions, the most suitable 
prototypes have been hypothesised.  
Where red dictators coexist with promising democrats activates a schema in 
memory, we are reluctant to simply derive corresponding schemas based on the 
meaning of achieved dimensions, since the semantic differential technique used here 
is not suitable for  this purpose.  
The first and most important dimension of political leader categorisation has 
been termed political aptitude. This dimension accounts for  roughly half of the total 
variation and has a rather complex  meaning. Visual inspection of this factor indicates 
that  political aptitude encompasses competence, efficacy and the leadership abilities  
of  politicians. Indeed, second-level factor analysis performed on this factor shows 
that political aptitude further splits into competence  (competent, self-assured, 
educated and smart), effi cacy (industrious, purposive and principled) and charisma 
(discreet, good speaker, inspirational, able to lead and possesses political vision).  
The second dimension  has been defined as  reliability. If  competence deals 
mainly with leadership potential, reliability has applied relevance to a leader’s 
determination and capacity for work. Reliability also implies the trust people put in 
political leaders based on their capability, decisiveness and bravery. The reliability 
factor consists of two major sub-categories: activity (brave, active, and independent)  
and  strength  of  mind  (determined and persistent).  
The integrity dimension reflects the idea of trustworthiness, represented by 
such categories as empathy, sincerity, honesty and decency. Similar to the reliability 
dimension, integrity also deals with the confidence one puts in  political  leaders  
whilst implying a quite different aspect of trust. By specifying a different factor 
solution and extracting a different number of factors,  the  single  factor  which  can  
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be defined as trust straddles both reliability and integrity dimensions. As Miller et al. 
(1986) put it, reliability is trust in a political leader in terms of their capabilities rather 
than honesty, while integrity is based on the truthfulness of a leader. Therefore it  
may be argued that reliability may refer to whether a leader can be trusted from a 
professional perspective while integrity rather implies interpersonal trust.  
If the previous dimensions are commonly found in similar studies using 
different samples (Miller et al., 1986),  the  fourth  dimension, affl uence, arguably 
represents a post-Soviet artefact. It appears to reflect the method of  entry to politics 
from business or using politics as a source for selfenrichment. Following the collapse 
of the USSR, getting into politics was almost  an  end  in  itself  for  a number of  
newly wealthy Ukrainians  as  it provided  a  convenient  way  to  sustain  and  boost 
their own businesses whilst  holding  legal  inviolability as elected deputies. Finally, 
the fifth dimension is a leader’s image or personal characteristics. This factor 
resembles  the  likeability dimension found in other studies and  reflects respondents’ 
personal likes and dislikes in politicians (Rosenberg, 1977; Miller et al., 1986).  
This analysis confirms our assumption that post-Soviet voters mainly refer to 
personality characteristics rather than political-ideological criteria when considering 
images of political leaders.  
  The conceptualisation of political leaders by Ukrainian voters  
In the previous study the semantic differential technique was combined with 
EFA to obtain dimensions of categorisation referred to by respondents when 
processing information about political leaders. However, alternative methodology is 
required to move from categorisation to political leader  schemas  and  prototypes.  A 
combination of Q-methodology  and qualitative techniques, such as the thinking-
aloud technique, provides an insight, albeit based on explicit comments, into how 
political leaders are linked in respondents’ memories, while cluster analysis helps to 
confirm the underlying structure. An alternative view to this approach is to consider 
what can possibly ‘glue’ certain politicians together in the respond ent’s memory. By 
processing the aggregate Q-sort matrix it is possible to discover how political leaders 
are linked together, which leads to consideration of what links them together. We 
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argue that the reason for these links is that they fit the same cognitive schema which 
already exist in respondents’ memories. To this end schemas referring to both 
quantita tive (multivariate statistical analysis) and qualitative (thinking-aloud char 
acteristics) criteria are defined.  
In the third study respondents were invited to sort cards carrying the topical 
names of domestic and foreign leaders into an arbitrary number of groups whilst 
commenting on the logic applied in the sorting task as well as defining and  
describing the respective groups. Hierarchical cluster analysis was used to process the 
data. This combination of Q-sort and cluster analysis aimed at grouping objects based 
on their semantic proximity enabled us to define a taxonomy of political  leaders,  
where  each  cluster is presumably underpinned by cognitive schema.  
The analysis of  data collected from this sample of ‘typical voters’ yielded a 
four-cluster solution. The first cluster groups leaders characteised as unknown, 
unremarkable and average as well as those opposite to them in nature – i.e., 
successful and mature leaders holding political office. We believe that the cognitive  
schema  underlying  this  cluster is political potential and it  includes the criteria  of 
leadership  abilities, charisma  and  political  viability. Due to the nature of  cluster  
analysis,  the  political aptitude dimension elicited in the previous study could not be 
correlated with the schema of political potential, but further analysis based on  
thinking-aloud comments indicates their relatedness. However, the political potential 
schema has a somewhat narrower connotation with the focus on the political abilities 
and viability of a politician, rather than on his or her competence and efficacy. In 
voters’ memories potential is represented by two subtypes of politicians – mediocre 
politicians  (average and unpromising domestic politicians) and successful politicians  
(mature, successful, already realising their potential in politics and serving  in office).  
The second cluster groups Western leaders (Bill  Clinton, Francois Mitterrand  
and  John  Major)  whom  Ukrainian  respondents  defined  as real professionals. 
Although this cluster has a somewhat complex mean- ing,  i.e.  foreign  leader,  
competent  and  successful,  the accompanying thinking-aloud  characteristics  enable  
the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  that the underlying cognitive schema may be defined 
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as competence, with the respective leader prototype described as professional  or 
expert. Arguably, this  is  a  characteristic  respondents  struggled  to  find  among  
domestic leaders during the 1990s, recalling the saying that no man is a prophet in his 
own country, especially during crises. However, this characteristic was attributed to 
prominent foreign politicians, who benefited from asso- ciation with the prosperity of 
their respective countries. It is illustrative that respondents’ thinking-aloud responses 
implied that ‘their’ (foreign) political leaders are much better, more professional, 
discreet, moral and patriotic than ‘ours’ (domestic).  
The  third  cluster  contains  active  Ukrainian  politicians  who  did  not enjoy 
public confidence and whose names were disgraced. According to thinking-aloud 
responses they define Ukrainian politics and possess real power,  but  at  the  same  
time are characterised as untrustworthy and anxious about advancing their own 
careers and making a profit. Such a combination  of characteristics makes  this cluster 
rather  hard to define. This represents what Anderson (1996) calls a ‘tangled network’ 
of con- cepts  linked  together  in  a  system  without  a  predetermined  hierarchy. 
Apparently  recognition  of  politicians  here  is  based  on  a formal  status criterion 
which in turn is linked to the criteria of reliability (dependability) and trustworthiness  
(integrity or morality). In a sample of typical voters, (considered here as political 
novices) this combination of formal status and trustworthiness schemas yields three 
political types: symbol of the past – an orthodox communist exemplified by ‘old 
school’ Soviet politicians who do not want to adjust to the new social and political 
realities; dilettante – lacking professionalism and competence; careerist – abusing 
politics as a tool with which to serve their own interests. 
The fourth and final cluster represents modern, progressive, experienced and 
up-and-coming politicians. Here the cognitive schema is defined as political 
perspective (past vs. future) and the underlying leader prototype as an economist-
reformer, adhering to the most common characteristics attributed by respondents. 
Considering the economic situation in the Ukraine following the collapse of the 
USSR and widespread credence given to cure-all reformers, the identification of this 
political type should not seem strange. Assuming that political-ideological cues in 
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terms of socio-political transformation were too abstract for the majority of Ukrainian 
voters, we believe that political orientation schema may serve as a proxy for ideology 
and party affiliation as well as helping voters develop a hypothesis of what to expect 
from a politician and forecast their political strategies.  
Table 10.3. Voters’ conceptualisation of Ukrainian political leaders (Study 3)  
 
Cognitive schema Implied 
leader prototype 
Thinking aloud 
characteristics   
Political potential (leadership 
abilities, charisma and political 
viability) 
Mediocr
e politician. 
Successful 
politician  
Average, mediocre, 
inexperienced, unpromising. Plays 
leading roles in politics, successful, 
has real status, holds office 
Competence (professionalism 
and expertise) 
Expert Ideal leader, political 
heavyweight, leader you can rely 
on 
Formal status and 
trustworthiness (reliability and 
integrity) 
Symbol 
of the past  
 
Dilettant
e 
 
Careerist 
 
‘Old guard’, out of date 
leader, untrustworthy, unreliable, 
has no understanding of the people 
Shoddy leader, breaks 
everything he tries, unprofessional, 
unreliable, 
Cunning, tricky, puppets, 
servers, easy to fail people’s 
interests, immoral 
Political perspective 
(Orientation on future  vs. past) 
Economi
st-reformer 
Smart, forward-looking, 
reformer, expert in economics 
 
In the fourth study forty respondents, who were identified as politically 
engaged opinion leaders were recruited. The criteria for respondents’ selection were 
self-reported frequency of exposure to political inormation, an interest in politics  and  
willingness to share their opinion with others; most respondents had completed a 
degree. To the expanded list of modern domestic and foreign leaders were added a 
number of historically prominent politicians, and respondents were instructed to  
divide them into an arbitrary number of groups and give characteristics to respective 
groups, explaining  the  reasons  for  inclusion  of  certain  leaders  in  each group. 
Similar to the previous study the data were cluster analysed.  
Analogous with the third study, the first cluster combines political leaders 
according to their political  potential. Likewise, this schema also includes the criteria 
of leadership ability, charisma and the political viability of a politician. However, 
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relative political experts have a more developed conceptualisation of leaders, as this 
cluster further splits into four distinct sub-clusters, each representing a specific type 
of leader. The first sub-cluster almost entirely overlaps with the mediocre politician 
type defined in the previous study and includes politicians whom respondents define 
as average and unpromising. The second sub-cluster groups politicians similarly 
characterised as mediocre with little or no political experience, but who are 
nevertheless considered quite competent in their field, mostly economics. This 
subtype was defined as skilled professional but poor leader. Ironically the subsequent 
Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko and then a chief of a national bank fell into 
this sub-cluster. The third subcluster brings together well-known leaders like Adolf 
Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Saddam Hussein, Mikhail Gorbachev and 
Boris Yeltsin. Taking into account thinking-aloud characteristics, this  subtype was 
defined  as  power-hungry or dictator. As far as Gorbachev and Yeltsin seem to 
deviate from the conception of what one could call true dictators, it is appropriate to 
re-emphasise the sample selection in this study. Some respondents would have 
characterised Gorbachev or Yeltsin as democrats or reformers, while it is quite 
possible that for more politically sophisticated respondents  they were ‘dictators in 
disguise’or, in other words, authoritarian leaders with a democratic image. Finally, 
the last sub-cluster combines Ukrainian and Russian politicians whom respondents 
considered quite successful but played only secondary roles in politics. We believe 
that this classification is represented  in  respondents’ memories as weak politicians. 
The second overall cluster represents a group of mostly, but not exclusively 
Western political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, John 
Major, Jacques Chirac and Yitzhak Rabin and the first president  of  the  Ukraine  in  
1918, Mykhailo Gryshevskyi. They were characterised as competen professionals, 
pragmatists, smart, welleducated, and successful politicians. Similar to the previous 
study,  we defined the cognitive schema underlying this cluster as competence, with 
the respective prototype of expert. Apparently the categorisation criteria respondents 
might use here are also similar to those described in the previous study, i.e., 
professionalism, expertise and competence. The competence cluster contains two 
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sub-clusters defined as expert-pragmatist and expert-intellectual.Similar to political 
novices, the sample of more politically experienced voters yields a third cluster  
containing the phenomenon of  a  tangled schema network. As  before a formal  status 
schema  acts  in  conjunction with reliability and trustworthiness. Quite possibly this 
tangled network may encompass other more abstract schemas, such as personal 
characteristics, competence, populism and orientation to the past or future. This 
complex cluster contains six sub-clusters representing particular types of political 
leaders. These types were defined as modern professional and dilettante (based on the 
competence criterion), careerist and businessman (integrity criterion), and 
demagogue andpolitical bankrupt (reliability criterion). The modern professional type 
is characterised as signifying the ‘new school’, smart and up to date, a leader in 
contrast to the incompetent dilettante who plays supporting roles in politics. Careerist 
and businessman types are both regarded as unsympathetic to people and pursuing 
their own inter ests. The difference between them is that while one struggles at first to 
advance his/her own political status, politics is later used as a source for self-
enrichment.  Demagogue  and political  bankrupt are  both  defined  as inefficient and  
unreliable  types  where  the first  one,  as respondents  put it, ‘talks  a  lot  but  does  
nothing’,  and  the  latter  is  disgraced  through wrongdoing in the past. A good 
illustration of respondents’ attitudes to Ukrainian politicians is that five out of these 
six types are characterised negatively.  
The fourth cluster represents a new generation of  Ukrainian and Russian  
leaders  whom  respondents  define  as  promising  and  forward- looking but who 
have not yet achieved substantial successes and realised themselves in politics. 
Paraphrasing Taylor and Crocker (1981), this may be a type of leader for whom 
respondents have not yet fully developed hypotheses for further  interpretation. 
Consequently, such leaders are defined as modern and promising but at the same time 
as unfamiliar to respondents. The underlying leader schema here was interpreted as 
having a political perspective (with an orientation to the future). This cluster consists 
of three sub-clusters representing leader prototypes: dark horse – political leaders 
whom voters characterise as promising but almost completely unknown to them; 
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economist-reformer – believed to be competent in the market economy but yet to 
achieve visible success; and modest professional, whom voters regard as experts in 
their own field (like banking or industry) but who have not yet become sufficiently 
well known to set out a political agenda.  
Finally, the fifth cluster groups politicians bearing characteristics of old school 
Soviet-style leaders. Based on the analogy of the fourth cluster, we interpreted the 
respective schema aspolitical perspective (with an orientation to the past). This 
cluster has two sub-clusters that represent corresponding. 
 Where red dictators coexist with promising democrats prototypes defined as a 
symbol of the past and apparatchik or state clerk. The first  is  characterised as an 
obsolete  and  unchanged  bureaucrat  with  a Soviet  mindset, while the second is 
viewed as a ‘chameleon’ who has successfully adjusted to the new political reality. 
As can be seen here, a more general  political perspective  cluster found in  a  sample  
of  typical voters’ splits into two more narrow clusters indicating politicians’ orien- 
tations to the past versus the future. As one would expect, political sophisticates have 
also developed a more detailed classification of types of leader.  
Our  studies  shed  some  light  on  the  problem  of  voters’ perceptions of 
politicians following the collapse and disappearance of communist rule in  the 
Ukraine. Unfortunately, due to the absence of corresponding research prior to the fall 
of the Iron Curtain, the opportunity to reconstruct how people organised their beliefs 
about politics and politicians during communist rule is not feasible. As our research 
only captures subsequent changes in citizens’ cognitive  systems without referring to 
their  previous state, these conclusions will in one way or another bear this limitation.  
It is nevertheless clear that the cognitive system of post-Soviet voters indeed 
underwent significant changes following the collapse and split of the Soviet Union. 
The best evidence for this is the development of brand new political prototypes that 
certainly reflect the post-communist zeitgeist. An alternative way to understand 
changes in citizens’ conceptualisation of politicians is through thepolitical 
perspective schema. It is likely this schema developed alongside political 
transformations following Perestroika and captured the orientation of politicians 
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drifting from communism to radical reforms. In terms of rapidly changing ideologies 
and development of a multi-party system in the Ukraine, the political perspective 
schema appeared to be both a simpler and more reliable substitute for ideology and 
party affiliation schemas relevant to voters in stable political systems like the US, but 
not yet developed by Ukrainian voters.  
Table 10.4. Conceptualisation of leaders by respondents with political  
Cognitive schema Implied leader  
prototype(s) 
Thinking-aloud 
characteristics   
Political potential 
(leadership abilities, charisma and 
political viability) 
Mediocre politician 
 
Skilled professional but 
poor leader  
Power-hungry or dictator  
 
Weak 
Average, mediocre, 
inexperienced, unpromising  
Average politician but 
good specialist 
Large-scale, global 
ambitions, unconquerable will  
Small-scale, playing 
secondary roles 
Competence 
(professionalism and expertise)  
Expert 
 
 
Expert-  pragmatist 
 
Expert- intellectual 
Professional, competent, 
pragmatist, intelligent, smart, 
successful, patriot 
Professional, democratic, 
educated, pragmatic, successful in 
practice 
Professional, intelligent, 
educated, good theorist but not 
successful in practice 
Formal status and 
trustworthiness (reliability and 
integrity) 
Modern professional 
Dilettante 
 
Careerist 
 
 
 
 
Businessman Demagogue 
(populist) 
Political bankrupt 
Professional, smart, 
modern 
Semi-professional, 
average, playing secondary roles in 
politics 
Pursuing own career 
interest, not caring about people, 
selfish, aspiring to advance own 
status, carpetbagger, crook 
Smart and far-sighted 
Professes too much; all 
talk no action, unreliable, never 
keeps promises, chatterbox 
Disgraced, compromised, 
unreliable, cannot be trusted, 
futureless 
 
Political perspective 
(Orientation to the future) 
Dark horse 
 
Economist- reformer 
 
Modest professional 
Dark horse, promising, 
stranger, as yet unrealised 
Smart, professional, 
businesslike; as yet unrealised 
Competent, honest, 
decent, lacking  leadership skills, 
as yet unrealised 
Political perspective 
(Orientation to the past) 
Symbol of the past 
Apparatchik or state clerk 
‘Old guard’, obsolete, 
double-minded, unreliable, 
populist 
Time-server, chameleon, 
average leader, untrustworthy 
Київський університет імені Бориса Грінченка 
© П.Д. Фролов, О.В. Петрунько, Д.В Позняк, 2013 
 
  Conclusions  
The studies described here confirm that post-Soviet voters do think about 
politics in terms of a limited number of categories but the way they organise their 
knowledge is reminiscent of other findings, closely resem- bling those from studies 
on non-Ukrainian samples. At least three dimen- sions of categorisation were 
repeatedly elicited from studies which used similar  methodology, e.g., Miller et al., 
1986:  reliability, integrity and personal attributes. In fact, taking into account the 
broad political apti- tude dimension consisting of competence, efficacy and charisma, 
the model derived from our studies almost entirely overlaps with the competence, 
charisma, integrity, reliability and personal dimensions found by Miller et al. (1986). 
This gives rise to the possibility of a fairly stable set of cross-cultural cognitive 
criteria relatively unaffected by nuances of polit- ical systems. Put simply, these 
criteria constitute a universal standard for the ideal political leader and provide a 
benchmark for further evaluation of political candidates.  
Although post-Soviet voters may in many ways have similar standards for 
judging political leaders, they cannot avoid certain important distinc- tions. A 
remarkable example is an affluence dimension in the categorisation system of 
Ukrainian voters, which carries a unique post-Soviet connotation. This criterion may 
serve to explain the latent motivation of candidates, such as a focus on personal profit 
or gain, as well as describing the  route  into  politics  which  is  often  from  business.  
Survey  research suggests that in  Ukrainian public consciousness  the affluence  of 
politicians is often viewed in two conflicting ways. The first one bears a somewhat 
utopian assumption that a wealthy candidate can help voters (in the Ukraine this was 
at least partially true during election campaigns), while the second view is that ‘a 
leopard cannot change his spots’ and those with new-found wealth do not follow 
altruistic goals in politics (Petrun’ko, 2000). Notwithstanding this distinction, in most 
other respects the way post-Soviet voters organised their knowledge of  political 
leaders and candidates was as expected. This is evidenced both by the structure of 
politician-related schemas and by embedded leader prototypes. Furthermore  the  
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combination  of  mass  survey,  Q-methodology,  multivariate statistical modelling 
and projective methods elicited a stable set of  cognitive  schemas  through  which  
citizens  organise  their  knowledge about politicians. In both less and more 
politically sophisticated voters a four-dimensional model was derived, which 
included political potential, competence, formal status and trustworthiness and 
political perspective.  
It is important to emphasise that the categorisation dimensions achieved by 
applying a semantic differential approach do not entirely overlap with the schema 
structures elicited using Q-methodology. This is  particularly evident with the 
affluence and personal characteristic dimensions although these criteria are  
apparently incorporated into other schemas and were made explicit by respondents in 
thinking-aloud comments. There are two possible  reasons  for  this  inconsistency.  
The first, and perhaps most plausible, is the difference in research methodology, i.e., 
semantic differential versus Q-sorting. Somewhat less likely is objective change in  
respondents’  cognitive systems explained by an eighteen-month interval between the  
two  studies. However,  virtually identical solutions using samples of less and more 
politically sophisticated  voters were obtained using Q-sort methodology, which 
suggests time lag was not the issue.  
As the Subtyping model of schema change suggests,  political  leader schemas 
held by Ukrainian voters do accommodate a broad number of subtypes in order to 
account for the wide range of candidates. Although it is not possible to retrace their 
development, it is likely that by the mid- 1990s a communist leader type –  
presumably dominant prior to Perestroika – was not most salient for Ukrainian voters. 
Moreover, this and similar political types (the orthodox communist symbol of the 
past and political  apparatchik) were more defined by the criteria of obsolescence and 
orientation to the past than by the ideology to which they adhered. In the  absence  of  
more  elaborate  political  and  ideological  schemas,  the orientation of politicians 
towards the future or past played an apparently important  role  in  helping  citizens  
develop  basic  expectations  of  their elected representatives.  
This does not mean, of course, that voters were not detecting a ‘legacy of 
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communism’ in Ukrainian politics in the 1990s. It is more likely that due  to  the  
exodus  from  the  Communist  Party  and  divergence  from prevailing ideology the 
presumed communist leader type transformed in the public consciousness into others, 
for example to dilettante, career- ist, demagogue or politically bankrupt, as all of 
these at least partially comprise former members of the Communist Party. The 
rapidly growing and chaotic political scene witnessed the spread of numerous ideol- 
ogies  and  the  entry  of  fresh  political  players, which  in  turn  led  to  the 
development of new leader prototypes in the cognitive system of voters. However, 
most of these new types carry negative connotations as described above and these 
reflect fairly well the prevalent  attitude  of Ukrainian voters to domestic politics and 
politicians. The reason for this could be attributed to a huge economic crisis and the 
deterioration of living standards in the Ukraine after the fall of the USSR. In 
comparison, the relative prosperity of Western nations led Ukrainian respondents to 
recognise Western leaders as uniformly credible, competent and expe- rienced 
politicians.  
Our findings  suggest  that  in  terms  of  social-economic  instability  the major 
call of Ukrainian respondents was not only for a trustworthy and competent leader 
but also for the economist-reformer type able to cope with crisis. This type 
summarised the conception of an ideal Ukrainian politician in the 1990s. 
Paraphrasing Kinder et al. (1980), this conception may stem from widely shared 
beliefs about  ‘cure-all’ modern reformers fuelled by the media and politicians, when 
in reality their ability to cope with such a crisis, as well as the limitations of current 
politicians, led many to fall short of this standard. 
Somewhat  contrary  to  our  expectations,  respondents  with  relative political  
expertise  essentially  have  the  same  set  of  leader  schemas  as political novices. 
Similarly to Pierce (1993), we find that sophisticated voters do not differ from 
novices in their use of less abstract personal and performance  characteristics  of  
politicians. Also contrary to what was expected, political sophisticates did not appear 
even partially to organise information about politicians based on ideological criteria. 
There is, however, a substantial difference between sophisticates and novices in the 
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effective number of political subtypes they develop, store and apply in  considering  
political  leaders.  Those  with  relatively  more  political expertise seem to have a 
more developed conceptualisation of political leaders  though,  once  again,  these  
political  subtypes  essentially  fit  the same leader schemas. Nevertheless it is also 
possible that eliciting more leader subtypes can be partially attributed to the expanded 
list of politicians suggested to respondents in the final study. While flaws in design 
cannot be completely ruled out, thinking-aloud protocols collected from the 
politically aware sample do indicate an increased abstract knowledge of politics.  
Our  findings confirm the assumption that in the course of social and political  
transformations following the collapse of USSR, voters developed relatively simple 
cognitive schemas relying on personal and professional characteristics: likeability, 
charisma, competence and reli- ability as well as politicians’ orientation to the past or 
future. In terms of socio-political changes and ideological chaos in Ukraine in the 
1990s,  these  cognitive  categories  were  proven  to  be  more  robust  and less prone 
to change as they focused on stable and fundamental characteristics instead of more 
complex and malleable political-ideological criteria.  
As our studies have been inductive and exploratory in nature, it  is important to 
point out certain theoretical and methodological limitations. Given a limited set of  
studies  on  voters’  cognitive  system  in  the  postcommunist states we had to rely on 
assumptions rather than established views  in  our  theoretical  framework.  Due  to  
the  absence  of  specifically designed mass surveys in the Ukraine we devised our 
own methodology for the empirical part of the study. Nevertheless, our studies shed 
some light on the cognitive system of Ukrainian post-Soviet voters shortly after the  
collapse  of  the  USSR,  which  have  been  and  largely  remain terra incognita for 
political  psychologists.  We believe that  future  studies may find it interesting and 
practical to focus on further dynamic changes in cognitive  schema  during  the  late  
1990s and 2000s. This, in its turn, necessitates  mobilisation  of  methods  typically  
used in  political  schema research, as outlined in this chapter.  
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